Creating false memories: Effects of varying types of details contained in photographs by Hessen, Joanna K.
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Major Papers 
2008 
Creating false memories: Effects of varying types of details 
contained in photographs 
Joanna K. Hessen 
University of Windsor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Hessen, Joanna K., "Creating false memories: Effects of varying types of details contained in 
photographs" (2008). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 7956. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/7956 
This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters’ theses of University of Windsor 
students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, 
in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, 
Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder 
(original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would 
require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or 
thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email 
(scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208. 
NOTE TO USERS 




Creating False Memories: Effects of varying types of details contained in photographs 
by 
Joanna K. Hessen 
University of Windsor 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies 
through Psychology 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
the Degree of Master of Arts at 
the University of Windsor 
Windsor, Ontario, Canada 
2008 
© Joanna K. Hessen 
1*1 Library and Archives Canada 
Published Heritage 
Branch 
395 Wellington Street 





Patrimoine de I'edition 
395, rue Wellington 
Ottawa ON K1A0N4 
Canada 
Your file Votre reference 
ISBN: 978-0-494-47057-2 
Our file Notre reference 
ISBN: 978-0-494-47057-2 
NOTICE: 
The author has granted a non-
exclusive license allowing Library 
and Archives Canada to reproduce, 
publish, archive, preserve, conserve, 
communicate to the public by 
telecommunication or on the Internet, 
loan, distribute and sell theses 
worldwide, for commercial or non-
commercial purposes, in microform, 
paper, electronic and/or any other 
formats. 
AVIS: 
L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive 
permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives 
Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, 
sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public 
par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, prefer, 
distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans 
le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, 
sur support microforme, papier, electronique 
et/ou autres formats. 
The author retains copyright 
ownership and moral rights in 
this thesis. Neither the thesis 
nor substantial extracts from it 
may be printed or otherwise 
reproduced without the author's 
permission. 
L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur 
et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. 
Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de 
celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement 
reproduits sans son autorisation. 
In compliance with the Canadian 
Privacy Act some supporting 
forms may have been removed 
from this thesis. 
While these forms may be included 
in the document page count, 
their removal does not represent 




Conformement a la loi canadienne 
sur la protection de la vie privee, 
quelques formulaires secondaires 
ont ete enleves de cette these. 
Bien que ces formulaires 
aient inclus dans la pagination, 
il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. 
iii 
AUTHOR'S DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY 
I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis and that no part of this thesis 
has been published or submitted for publication. 
I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, my thesis does not infringe upon 
anyone's copyright nor violate any proprietary rights and that any ideas, techniques, 
quotations, or any other material from the work of other people included in my thesis, 
published or otherwise, are fully acknowledged in accordance with the standard referencing 
practices. Furthermore, to the extent that I have included copyrighted material that 
surpasses the bounds of fair dealing within the meaning of the Canada Copyright Act, I 
certify that I have obtained a written permission from the copyright owner(s) to include 
such material(s) in my thesis and have included copies of such copyright clearances to my 
appendix. 
I declare that this is a true copy of my thesis, including any final revisions, as 
approved by my thesis committee and the Graduate Studies office, and that this thesis has 
not been submitted for a higher degree to any other University or Institution. 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
Recent research has suggested that false narratives produce higher false memory 
rates than false photographs. This has been explained in terms of photographs being higher 
in constraint, defined as the limitation of freedom to develop familiar details about a 
memory, because they are a snapshot of a moment and may discourage imagination when 
attempting to remember the event. This study extends previous research by exploring the 
effects of constraining and self-relevant details in false photographs upon false memory 
formation. Seventy-six participants were randomized to conditions where either a non-self 
relevant or self-relevant detail was paired with either a non-constraining or constraining 
detail. Over the course of three sessions during which they were encouraged to provide as 
much descriptive detail about their memories, participants viewed 4 photographs allegedly 
provided by their parents, one of which depicted an alleged childhood balloon ride with a 
parent. They rated how much they remembered each photograph, as well as the quality of 
their memories. Additionally, participants' transcripts from the first and third sessions were 
rated by two independent judges as to the extent to which they constituted visual images or 
memories. Consistent with predictions, individuals who received self-relevant information 
without associated constraining information in photographs provided the highest memory 
ratings, and endorsed certain memory characteristics (e.g. visual images, event coherence, 
emotional content) for the false event. However, predicted differences in judge's ratings of 
events as memories were not observed. Groups showed statistically equal false memory 
formation rates at both time points, achieving an overall images rate of 20.9% and memory 
rate of 12.4%. This research has implications in both the therapeutic and legal arenas. 
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A topic which has received ongoing attention in the literature and the criminal 
justice system for over a decade is that of "false" or "implanted" memories. It has been 
argued that an individual can come to "remember" situations or events that never 
happened and people or things that never even existed. When remembering an event, 
distortion naturally occurs because memory does not function like a video recording that 
can be played back in order to view past events exactly as they were experienced. 
Because memories are considered to be based more on reconstruction of elements than on 
rote recall of a single memory (Wright & Loftus, 1998), they are susceptible to change. 
Since reconstruction involves piecing together separate components of memory into a 
representation of the episode being remembered, at the time of retrieving a past event, 
new material may be incorporated into existing memories, and old material may be 
reorganized in novel ways which do not reflect original experience. 
EARLY FALSE MEMORY RESEARCH 
These concerns over the reliability of memory have given rise to a branch of 
research dealing specifically with issues involving distorted or implanted memories. This 
literature developed out of concerns over the accuracy of memory in a number of 
domains, such as the accuracy of eyewitness testimony, false confession, the effects of 
purported memory enhancing techniques such as hypnosis, and the accuracy of childhood 
memories recovered during therapy. Prior research convincingly demonstrates that 
memory is fallible. For example, memories can be altered by providing post-event 
information that is misleading - a phenomenon termed the "misinformation effect" 
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(Loftus, 2004). However, even without overt manipulation and attempts to deceive, 
memories are susceptible to decay. Even the most vividly experienced of memories 
appear susceptible to distortion and decay. Numerous studies have demonstrated that 
"flashbulb memories" are no more likely to be accurate than are ordinary memories. In 
one recent example, Talarico and Rubin (2003) asked undergraduates at Duke University 
in North Carolina to record their memories of when they first heard of the terrorist attacks 
of September 11,2001 and also of a recent everyday event. They questioned them about 
their memory after 1 week, 6 weeks, and 32 weeks. They found that the consistency for 
both the 9/11 flashbulb memory and the memory of the everyday event did not differ: 
accuracy of recall for both events decreased over time. Nevertheless, participants rated 
vividness, recollection and belief in the accuracy of the 9/11 memories as greater than 
that of the everyday events. 
Thus, even memories subjectively experienced as vivid and accurate tend to 
naturally become distorted over time. Two mechanisms are frequently posited to explain 
such changes: decay and interference (Jenkins & Dallenbach, 1924). Briefly, when we 
learn something new, a neural pathway is created. Over time, that pathway (unless 
reinforced) slowly disintegrates until we cannot remember the originally learned material. 
Regarding decay, according to Ebbinghaus' classic research, the half life of human 
memory is approximately one hour, absent regular rehearsal (Ebbinghaus, Ruger & 
Bussenius, 1913) 
The second mode of forgetting, interference (Jenkins & Dallenbach, 1924), can be 
divided into two concepts: proactive and retroactive interference. Proactive interference 
involves the forgetting of new information due to information provided before the event 
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to be remembered. For example, if one were to take a French class followed by a Spanish 
class, the French words initially learned may interfere with the learning subsequent recall 
of the appropriate Spanish words on a test. Retroactive interference involves forgetting 
which is due to information provided after the event to be remembered. In the latter 
instance, the new (i.e. post-event information) alters or displaces original information. 
This information does not have to necessarily relate to the original event. For example, if 
the target event is a birthday party, then the occurrence of many future birthday parties 
that the individual experiences serve as post-event information. This post-event 
information may merge and integrate with the memory of the original birthday party, 
increasing the likelihood that details from the particular party being recalled will contain 
inaccurate information. When post-event information is inaccurate and relates to the 
original event, it is appropriately termed "post-event misinformation". This occurs when 
individuals encounter information from other sources (e.g. friends, television, 
newspapers, etc) regarding the event in question, and incorporate the new information 
into their recall for the original event (Wright, Self, and Justice, 2000; Loftus, 2007). 
The classic misinformation study was conducted by Loftus and Palmer in 1974. 
They had 45 participants view videotapes of car accidents and subsequently estimate how 
fast the vehicles were going when they collided. Verbs in their questions varied between 
experimental groups, from "collided" and "smashed" to "hit," "bumped," and 
"contacted,". Participants' estimates of speed were 20% higher when a strong verb such 
as "crashed" was presented, contrasted with weak verbs such as "contacted". 
Furthermore, when retested a week later, participants that had been questioned with 
"smashed" were more than twice as likely to report that they had seen a broken headlight, 
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even though there was no broken headlight in the videotape. 
A substantial body of work over the years has consistently documented the 
negative effects of misinformation (Loftus, 2007). For example, in a more recent study 
(Okado & Stark, 2005) participants viewed a video of a man stealing a woman's wallet. 
Participants were subsequently provided with misinformation about a central aspect of 
the event the event. Finally, participants were questioned about what they remembered 
about the event, with 47% remembering the incorrect detail provided to them. The 
importance of this study is that it demonstrates that it is possible to alter memory for a 
central detail of a scene, although it has been suggested that it is easier to alter peripheral 
details (Heath & Erickson, 1998). Another recent study showed that suggesting that 
someone had consumed alcohol (by providing a placebo that study participants are told 
contains alcohol) is enough make people more susceptible to misinformation and to make 
them inappropriately confident in their memory (Assefi & Garry, 2003). 
SUGGESTING FALSE MEMORIES FOR ENTIRE EVENTS 
Suggesting false events using Narratives 
A criticism of research that examines the alteration of existing true memories, 
however, is that it is not at all getting at the core of one of the issues that has stimulated 
this work - namely the creation of completely novel memories (Pezdek & Lam, 2007). In 
the first study to address this question, Loftus and Pickrell (1995) used a false narrative to 
suggest a childhood event for recall. They asked 25 participants to recall 4 events which 
were presented in the form of a short verbal narrative. All of the narratives were allegedly 
provided by relatives of participants. Three of the events were true and researchers added 
a false narrative about the participant becoming lost in a shopping mall as a child. 
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Participants were encouraged to recall all of the events, and were questioned regarding 
their memory for events across two interviews. Twenty-nine percent of participants fully 
or partially "remembered" the false event (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). 
This methodological approach, termed the "familial-informant false-narrative 
procedure" (Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004), has since been employed in 
numerous studies. Amongst the events that have been suggested to participants, 
individuals have been lead to believe that they had been in the hospital with a high fever 
and suspected ear infection as a child (Hyman, Husband, Billings, 1995), that they had 
undergone a medical procedure in which a nurse removed a skin sample from their 
fingertip (Mazzoni & Memon, 2003), that they had almost drowned and been rescued by 
a lifeguard (Heaps & Nash, 2001), or even that they had been the victim of a brutal attack 
by an animal (Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999). Across nine studies it has been estimated 
that false memories successfully created in research participants approximately 33% of 
the time (Strange, Gerrie, & Garry, 2005). 
The power of narratives as a suggestive medium is thus apparent. However the 
methodology of requesting parents to provide events has been criticized. As previously 
mentioned, research has demonstrated that memories are fallible and subject to decay 
over time. This is true of parents as well as of children. It is thus entirely possible that 
when researchers request that parents provide various events experienced by the 
participant during childhood, parents' own memories may not be accurate. Therefore, 
when researchers are attempting to implant a false memory of being lost in a shopping 
mall, what they think is a false memory may not be such after all. How does one know if 
a false memory is not in fact a recovered true memory? 
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Another problem with using narratives that have been provided by parents or 
family members is that different members of the family may remember a given event 
differently. This is something that is often the subject of (not always friendly) dispute at 
family gatherings, especially when each party is certain that they remember the event 
correctly. Details may be added or omitted, people who were not present may be 
included, weather may change, etc. This begs the question: what constitutes an accurate 
childhood memory? Knowing what we know about the fallibility of memory and its 
decay over time, it is hard, if not impossible, to determine which version of events 
described is the way it really happened. If the two family members were to write out a 
narrative describing the same event, one description would be highly familiar to the 
individual, whereas the other would not. There are inevitably details, people, and places 
that the person does not remember. And yet, the authenticity of our family photographs is 
rarely ever questioned. Even when we are aware of software programs such as 
Adobe Photoshop , which can alter photographs, we just assume that our own family 
photographs are real (Strange et al., 2005). 
Suggesting false events using Photographs 
Wade, Garry, Read, and Lindsay (2002) studied the influence of childhood 
photographs, when they examined whether utilizing a doctored photograph would lead to 
acceptance of a false event as having occurred. They posited that if photographs are 
accepted unconditionally, then they should lead to high false memory rates. These 
researchers took four true photographs obtained from participants' family and doctored 
one of them using Adobe®Photoshop®. The doctored photograph depicted the participant 
with a parent in a hot air balloon. They encouraged 20 participants to attempt to 
remember the four events across three interviews, during which the photographs were 
presented. Participants were asked to provide a brief description of what was going on in 
the photo, and were asked some general and then some increasingly more specific 
questions regarding the details in each photograph. By the end of the third interview, 50% 
of participants were judged to have either fully or partially "remembered" the false event 
(Wade et al , 2002). 
The authors argued that the doctoring of photographs may be more effective in 
altering memory, because people may be more trusting of photos (see Wade et al., 2002) 
than of merely a verbal account. Perhaps they were more easily convinced that the event 
was true because the photographs were obtained from a reliable source, a family member. 
Family photos offer compelling evidence that the events depicted in them really took 
place, and they provide perceptual details of the alleged events which may act as memory 
cues (Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004). While Wade et al's (2002) results 
are suggestive that photographs promote greater false memories, most people would not 
find themselves presented with a picture that depicts then doing something they had 
never done before or being somewhere they had never been (Strange et al., 2005). Using 
the example of the squabbling relatives mentioned above, it is likely that when the details 
regarding a past event are under debate, individuals may look to provide evidence or to 
help cue them to details that will facilitate their remembering. 
Building upon this possibility, Lindsay et al (2004) observe that some memory 
recovery techniques encourage individuals to peruse family photo albums to aid in 
recalling unremembered childhood events. To explore the impact of such procedures 
upon false memory formation, these researchers asked whether people would be more 
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likely to endorse memory for a false event if they had a relevant picture to aid in the 
recall of the event. Utilizing the standard narrative paradigm described above, 
participants were encourage to recall a false event involving getting in trouble in Grade 1 
for putting a Slime toy in their teacher's desk. Participants' parents provided narratives 
for two events which occurred in early elementary school, and provided a number of 
class photographs from the same time period. All participants were presented with the 
three events in narrative form. Furthermore, half of the participants also received the 
narrative coupled with the matching class photograph to facilitate their "remembering". 
It is important to emphasize that this was not a doctored photograph, as was used 
by Wade et al. (2002), but a true photograph which was taken in the same time period 
that was represented in the false narrative. Lindsay et al. (2004) argued that if a person is 
led to believe that something happened to them through the provision of the false 
narrative, a photograph may provide the necessary details and images that facilitate the 
formation of a false memory. The results were supportive: they found that 72.8% of 
participants in the narrative plus photograph condition were judged as having memories 
or memory-like images, as compared to 45.5% for those who received the narrative 
alone. Clearly, a photograph is a strong facilitative device. Furthermore, this study 
demonstrates that true photographs used as recall aids can be just as hazardous as 
doctored photographs (Strange et al, 2005). 
Comparing narratives and photographs 
Thus, narratives and photographs have emerged as media for inducing false 
memories. On average, narratives result in false memories about 33%) of the time 
(Strange et al., 2005). The one study using doctored photographs resulted in a false 
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memory formation rate of 50% (Wade et al., 2002). However, as Garry & Wade (2005) 
note, to assume that doctored photographs result in more false memories is premature for 
several reasons. First, false memory rates vary widely within published studies, from 0% 
(Pezdek, Finger, and Hodge, 1997) to 82% (Garry & Wade, 2005). These differences are 
likely in part a function of the plausibility of events (Pezdek et al, 2006), and the wide 
ranging types of details used in the narratives of such studies (Desjardins & Scoboria, 
2007). Secondly, such a comparison between media is not well founded, as it is tenuous 
to argue that the details in a narratives and a photograph for the same event are 
equivalent. To be able to compare the two suggestive media, it is necessary to somehow 
equate them. 
Garry and Wade (2005) compared the two media by attempting to equate their 
characteristics, and examining whether they produce the similar or different rates of false 
memory formation. They again employed a hot-air balloon ride as the target event. They 
provided half of their participants with a narrative that described this event happening in 
their childhood, whereas the other half of participants were shown a picture depicting the 
event. Efforts were made to generate a narrative that was equivalent in detail to the 
photograph, by asking judges to generate as many descriptive details as they could 
regarding what was depicted in the photograph. The most frequently reported details 
were used to construct the false narratives. Participants were interviewed three times 
according to Wade et al.'s (2002) procedure, following which 50% of participants in the 
photograph condition were judged as having a memory for the event, as compared to 
82% of the participants in the narrative condition. 
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These results are inconsistent with Wade et al's (2002) explanation that 
photographs are more believable and trusted sources of information, which provide vivid 
details that promote formulation of memories of events. To explain this unexpected 
finding, Garry and Wade (2005) proposed the concept of "constraint". They argue that 
narratives require individuals to generate their own details to flesh out the story line. 
Photographs, on the other hand, already provide all of the details, thus limiting the 
flexibility of imagination. By doing so, photographs impose more constraint than do 
narratives. 
The primary purpose of the present research is to systematically investigate the 
influence of different types of details within photographs upon the promotion or 
detraction of false memory formation. As the results of Garry & Wade (2005) were 
unexpected, the explanation of photographs as providing "constraining" details was 
provided post-hoc. The present work will systematically define and operationalize 
"constraint", with an eye towards understanding how photographs with greater and fewer 
constraining characteristics relate to false memory formation. 
This was done in relation to a second variable recently documented by Desjardins 
and Scoboria (2007) as relevant to false memory formation. They have argued that the 
presence of self-relevant details in suggestive media is a strong predictor of false memory 
formation. Additionally, Strange, Hayne, and Garry (2008) have recently published a 
study where they presented 10 year-old children with photographs depicting a hot-air 
balloon event. Half of the children saw the hot-air balloon alone, whereas the other half 
saw a doctored photograph with themselves and their family members posing in the hot-
air balloon. The first photograph can be likened to the non-self-relevant, non-constrained 
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condition of the present study, whereas the second photograph can be likened to the self-
relevant, unconstrained condition (see below). The authors found that the children who 
had seen the hot-air balloon with themselves and their family posing inside were judged 
as having a developed a higher percentage of false memories than children who had seen 
the hot-air balloon by itself. By contrast, children's own memory ratings did not differ 
significantly according to whether or not they saw themselves and their family members 
in the hot-air balloon. The authors did not, however, address any constraining 
characteristics that may be present in photographs. 
Thus, this study focuses on articulating the relationship between the presentation 
of constraining and/or self-relevant details within a false photograph of a childhood event 
upon false memory formation. In the following section, each concept is described in 
detail. 
TWO MAIN VARIABLES PLAYING A ROLE IN FALSE MEMORY 
FORMATION 
Constraint 
As noted above, Garry and Wade (2005) explained their finding for an advantage 
of a false narrative over a doctored photograph in terms of constraint, which they defined 
as the limitation of freedom to develop familiar details about a memory. Although 
photographs are a rich source of details which might help cue memories, they are a 
relatively rigid snapshot of an event, and thus may reduce the freedom to generate 
personalized details when imagining the event depicted therein. The participant must 
incorporate the details provided in the photograph into their imagination of the event, and 
many of these details may not be familiar to them. Narratives, on the other hand, may 
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permit greater use of active imagination to "fill in" gaps in recall with details that are 
individually relevant to them. Garry and Wade (2005) further contend that if narratives 
do provide more room for generating details to "flesh out" a story line, then the 
participants who were in their narrative (vs. photograph) condition should have provided 
more details about where the hot air balloon ride took place, which is exactly what they 
found. 
Another way to conceptualize constraint is via self-schema theory, as articulated 
by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) in their model adapted from the work of Markus 
and Ruvolo (1989) and Markus and Nurius (1986). They propose that sets of self-
schemas exist within individuals, which consist of long-term memory representations of 
different concepts of the "self. A subset of these schemas are active at any given time 
and modulate individuals' thoughts and behaviors. Currently active schemas form what is 
called the "working self concept", which is a constantly changing view of the present self 
and what it may become. Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) argue that the goals of the 
working self are grounded in autobiographical memory, which limits the range of goals 
that a person can hold in order to maintain a healthy mental balance. Autobiographical 
memories that are dissonant with an individual's life period result in very strong 
(negative) cognitive reactions. Due to these negative cognitive reactions, memories that 
are dissonant with an individual's working self must be altered or reinterpreted in some 
way to reduce the negative feelings brought about by this dissonance. Two ways in which 
this reworking is accomplished are attempts at justification (labeling the memory that is 
resulting in these dissonant feelings as an exception to the norm) or attempts at 
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outweighing (finding multiple examples of consonant autobiographical events so that the 
single dissonant memory is outweighed). 
Based on this model, it can be hypothesized that unremembered events or event 
details that are consonant with an individual's "working self are less likely to stand out 
and thus will not be attended to as much as events that are dissonant. This is likely 
whether or not unremembered events are true or false. Dissonant events or details, on the 
other hand, may result in the above-mentioned negative cognitive reactions, thus 
increasing the likelihood that the event were rejected as false. 
This is consistent with Leon Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance, which 
states that contradicting thoughts or beliefs compel the mind to acquire or invent new 
thoughts or beliefs, or to modify existing ones, so as to reduce the amount of dissonance 
therein (Festinger, 1957). The goal of the working self, in Conway and Pleydell-Pearce's 
(2000) model, is to maintain cognitive consonance, meaning that new information 
encoded and subsequently retrieved needs to be reasonably consistent with a given 
individual's present autobiographical repertoire (i.e. the thoughts, beliefs, and memories 
that make up that individual's current sense of personal identity). Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce (2000) hold that this goal of the working self is what determines access to an 
individual's autobiographical knowledge base. The present working-self model dictates 
the generation of memory retrieval models, which guide the search process when an 
individual is trying to recall a past event. Such retrieval models thereby act as "gate 
keepers", which control access to autobiographical material by setting parameters (i.e. 
either shortcuts or roadblocks) in ways that facilitate or inhibit the search of the 
knowledge base. If the stimulus presented as a memory cue will lead to the search for a 
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memory that is dissonant with the goal of the self (i.e. does not "fit" into the memory 
repertoire of an individual) then the retrieval model generated (which seek to maintain 
cognitive consonance) will constrain the search for that memory. 
To relate this model to Garry and Wade's (2005) study, it is possible that the cues 
presented in photographs resulted in the generation of memory search models that were 
more constraining. This may have been the case with false events as well as with true 
events. For false events, the entire photograph depicts nothing but foreign details. 
Therefore, many of the details were likely dissonant with the individual's 
autobiographical repertoire, resulting in the generation of a highly constrained search 
model. This suggests that even photographs depicting true events may result in the 
generation of fairly constrained search models relative to a narrative description. 
To illustrate, consider a request to recall an event that happened in one's 
elementary school. If the event is presented as a narrative, one can visually imagine the 
school from any perspective they wish (from any angle, from the interior, the exterior, a 
specific room, etc.). If, on the other hand, when one sees their elementary school in a 
photograph, only one of many possible representations is made available. Therefore, a 
photograph is limiting in terms of the breadth of stimuli it can provide in order to 
facilitate remembering. For narratives, the lack of specificity, inherent vagueness and 
lack of visual detail allows for the generation of a greater number of idiosyncratic 
memory cues. Cues generated by the individual will naturally be experienced as more 
relevant, thus reducing the likelihood that a memory retrieval model were constraining. 
This suggests that unremembered events presented in narrative form were more likely to 
be endorsed as "having happened". Furthermore, it opens the possibility that constraint 
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may also vary within media. The question becomes not which media is superior in 
facilitating false memory formation, bur rather: What aspects of narratives or 
photographs might result in greater or lesser levels of constraint? 
Self-relevant details and Specific details 
What if the details provided by researchers in suggested events are highly self-
relevant? One would expect that the overall level of constraint for an event would be 
lower, because self-relevant details are consistent with the working model for the self. 
This was the question asked by Desjardins and Scoboria (2007) in relation to narratives. 
They identified a methodological confound in the false memory literature that utilized 
narratives as a suggestive medium: in some studies, the narratives were personalized to 
include information idiosyncratic to the participant (e.g., the name of the participant's 
hometown, name of a family member; Garry & Wade, 2005), while in other studies, the 
narratives did not contain such self-relevant details (e.g. Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). 
Interestingly, studies which included self-relevant details in narratives appeared to have 
higher rates of false memory formation - about 69.4% (Garry & Wade, 2005; Lindsay et 
al., 2004) vs, the estimated 33% on average in other false memory studies cited 
previously. Desjardins and Scoboria (2007) hypothesized that the presence of self-
relevant details were responsible for producing the elevated rates of false memory 
formation seen in these studies. 
Another factor that they explored was the presence of "specific" details in the 
narratives. They defined this type of detail as "elements of the narrative that could be 
removed without altering the general script (e.g. the toy was a "revolting Slime toy")". 
When such specific details are included in a narrative, they may serve the same effect as 
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the details in an unfamiliar photograph: constraining the ability to freely generate one's 
own relevant details. Using the same logic as above, the goals of the working self would 
generate a retrieval model that is likely to be more constraining than that those based 
solely upon self-relevant information, thus resulting in a lesser likelihood that the false 
event would be accepted as being true. 
To study these types of details (self-relevant and specific), Desjardins and 
Scoboria (2007) employed Garry & Wade's (2005) methodology, and Lindsay et al.'s 
(2004) false narrative (participant putting slime in a teacher's desk). This narrative was 
tailored to include self-relevant details, specific details, both, or neither. Parents of 
participants provided information about childhood events, and self-relevant details were 
included in self-relevant conditions (name of teacher in grade 1, name of a friend in that 
grade, name of a favorite toy that year). The results were consistent with the argument 
that self-relevant information would facilitate false memory formation. They found that 
68.2% of participants in self-relevant conditions were judged as having memories or 
memory-like images of the false event, as compared to 36.4% of participants in the non-
self-relevant conditions. Furthermore, subjective memory ratings were significantly 
greater when self-relevant information was included in false narratives. There was no 
effect found for the inclusion of highly specific details; while they did not impede the 
formation of false memories, they did not promote fluency. 
In terms of Conway & Pleydell-Pearce's (2000) model, these results from the 
inclusion of highly self-relevant details are expected. Essentially, highly self-relevant 
details should be more compatible with the working self, and thus a less constraining 
retrieval model should be generated. If these types of details are included in a study, they 
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may also serve as a "springboard" via the activation of other self-relevant details, leading 
to a greater likelihood that the false event were accepted as being true. The effect of self-
relevance may have been much greater than the constraining aspect of the specific details 
used, in that the self-relevant details served to promote fluent processing whereas the 
specific details did not. 
One reason that self-relevant information may promote false memory formation, 
while details generated by experimenters or encountered in an unfamiliar photograph do 
not, is the degree to which fluency is promoted. This is related to Jacoby and Dallas' 
(1981) attributional view of memory and Whittlesea's (1993) fluency attribution 
hypothesis, where feelings of familiarity do not necessarily result from the retrieval of a 
memory fragment, but rather from the unconscious attribution of fluent processing to 
prior exposure to a stimulus. Later, Whittlesea and Williams' (1998) modified the fluency 
attribution hypothesis model to what they termed the discrepancy attribution hypothesis, 
which states that feelings of familiarity occur when surprisingly good/fluent processing is 
attributed to prior exposure to a stimulus. To demonstrate this experimentally, they had 
participants study a list which contained three types of words: 1) real words (e.g. violin), 
2) non-words (e.g. plandit), and 3) pseudohomophones (e.g. bautel, phrawg). Then they 
provided a recognition test, presenting participants with a new list of words and asking 
them to identify old words and new words. They found that the previously un-presented 
pseudohomophones had the highest probability of being identified to be old words. This 
is because, whereas the pseudohomophones did not look like real words, the meaning 
comes to mind (i.e. "phrawg" gives rise to the meaning of the word "frog"). The ease 
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with which the familiar meaning of the "word" comes to mind (surprising fluency) is 
attributed to the fact that the word had been encountered before. 
Desjardins & Scoboria (2007) argue that self-relevant details likely induce 
feelings of familiarity and thus possibly facilitate rapid acceptance of the event as being 
about their past. If fluent processing is experienced when encountering an unremembered 
event, the accompanying sense of familiarity may well be erroneously attributed to the 
false event, rather than to the details that actually induce the feelings. Lack of presence of 
self-relevant details or the presence of particularly vivid specific details still leaves 
sufficient room for the individual to generate their own elaboration of the scene, although 
little has occurred to promote self-schematic activation or fluency. As mentioned above, 
literature suggests that false memory endorsement rates are not particularly high in these 
cases (Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007). 
This thinking is based on the fact that the "self - or the "working self-concept" 
that has been proposed by Conway & Pleydell-Pearce (2000) (see discussion above) - is 
amongst the most well-developed schematic constructs that exist in memory. As such, the 
working self is referred to frequently (Symons & Johnson, 1997) and any information 
that is relevant to the self is likely to be processed efficiently. Desjardins & Scoboria 
(2007) observe two ways in which this might occur. First, encountering self-relevant 
information is likely to produce fluent cognitive processing. Second, self-schematic 
activation is likely to promote activation of other aspects of the self, which then can be 
drawn into the "memory" for the event. This self-generation of details and images reflects 
a superior level of processing than does the mere acceptance of details already provided. 
In fact, Kronlund and Whittlesea (2005) demonstrated that deeper processing at encoding 
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results in greater fluency at retrieval. The result is that individuals are more likely to 
accept a false event as true: The feelings of familiarity are erroneously attributed to the 
event (e.g. the stimulus of the hot air balloon ride) as having been experienced before. 
A closely related concept is that of source monitoring, which refers to the 
cognitive processes involved in determining the origin of memory. Failures in source 
monitoring have been shown to play an important role in memory distortions (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). According to this source monitoring, or "reality 
monitoring", framework, the integration of the various features of an event into a 
complete whole is termed binding, which is thought to place at the moment of encoding. 
Deficient binding can result in a variety of source confusions (Koriat, Goldsmith & 
Pansky, 2000) when trying to access encoded information during remembering. For 
example, post-event information or other existing memories can get integrated into the 
new memory trace, thus distorting the memory for the original event experienced. The 
integration of elements unrelated to the event being remembered interferes with the 
encoding of the "pure" elements of the event (i.e. binding). At the moment of retrieval, 
this deficient binding can result in confusion when the person is trying to remember 
where they first experienced the event. This is because, as discussed above, memories are 
based on reconstruction as opposed to recall. As such, when remembering, fragments of a 
memory are pieced back together to form a whole. When the initial memory has been 
deficiently bound, interfering fragments can result in various source confusions. 
Summary 
The theoretical concepts discussed above relate to one another to help explain 
how false memories can come to be formed. An example of the integrative role that each 
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likely plays in the study of false memory can be found in examining Garry and Wade's 
(2005) study. To review, half of participants were presented with a narrative describing 
having been on a hot air balloon ride as a child, whereas the other half were presented 
with a photograph depicting this event. It is proposed that individuals who were in the 
narrative condition (vs. the photograph condition) were able to more freely imagine the 
self-relevant details that were presented to them. These self-relevant details promoted 
self-schematic activation which allowed the individuals to generate their own details to 
flesh out the story and make it more personalized to themselves. Participants in the 
narrative condition may have experienced surprisingly fluent processing as a result of 
encountering self-relevant information, which is misattributed to the event as familiar and 
"about themselves". This likely facilitated the generation of a sufficiently vivid image of 
the event in their minds. The source of this vivid image, in turn, may have been 
incorrectly attributed to a memory of an actual event from the past (i.e. that they had 
really gone on a hot air balloon ride as a child), thus demonstrating a breakdown in 
reality monitoring. 
The difference in the rates of false memory formation in the narrative vs. 
photograph condition can be explained by the degree to which each medium facilitated 
fluency, and the subsequent ease with which participants were further able to generate 
their own self-relevant details. Participants in both the narrative and photograph 
conditions saw self-relevant details, but due to the relatively non-constraining nature of 
the narrative medium, the participants in this group were able to generate self-relevant 
details with greater ease than those in the photograph condition. Details in the unfamiliar 
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photograph, on the other hand, may have both constrained fluency, and later inhibited 
development of images, resulting in a lower rate of false memory formation. 
MANIPULATING CONSTRAINT AND SELF-RELEVANT DETAILS IN 
PHOTOGRAPHS 
A limitation of Wade and Garry's (2005) study is that it's hard to be able to say 
unequivocally that a narrative is equivalent to a photograph in terms of the amount of 
information contained therein. There are two main types of suggestive media used in 
false memory literature - narratives and photographs. Both of these media influence the 
formation of false memories, with differing rates of success. Instead of attempting to 
equate the two, another approach is to systematically examine the mechanisms which 
underlie false memory formation in each medium prior to attempting to understand the 
similarities and differences of the media. 
Both therapeutic and legal settings employ photographs regularly for goals similar 
to those in which narratives are employed. This study set out to examine whether the 
same effects for self-relevant information are found in photographs as were found in 
narratives by Desjardins and Scoboria (2007). Two factors were examined: self-relevant 
(vs. non-self-relevant) details, and constraining (vs. non-constraining) details. 
This research study extends the work of Garry and Wade (2005) and Desjardins 
and Scoboria (2007) to further clarify the role of details presented in false photographs 
upon false memory formation. Prior work with false photographs supports the importance 
of examining the influence of self-relevance and constraint. Wade et al. (2002) used a 
self-relevant but relatively constraining photograph, in that it depicted the specific target 
event, leaving individuals less freedom to generate their own details to flesh out the 
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memory they were trying to "retrieve". Lindsay et al. (2004), on the other hand, used a 
self-relevant and non-constraining photograph. Their photograph did not depict the target 
event, but provided some self-relevant details to help the individual "recall". However, 
Lindsay et al (2004) provided their participants with a narrative along with the 
photograph. The current study represents the first effort to systematically examine the 
influence self-relevant and/or constraining aspects of false photographs, while holding 
the influence of narrative descriptions to a minimum. 
As suggested by Desjardins and Scoboria (2007), self-relevant details clearly have 
a significant effect when narratives are used as the suggestive medium. It is thus 
important to investigate how the effect of self-relevance will play out in photographs, 
which are more constraining than narratives because the self-relevant details are 
explicitly provided, limiting one's ability to imagine different perspectives of the same 
detail. 
Also, Desjardins and Scoboria (2007) point out that there may be a point where 
self-relevant details cease to enhance the formation of false memories, and may even 
impede the process. This might occur when self-relevant information is presented in 
excessive amounts or in a context which is incorrect. For example, if one were to include 
details about an individual's first grade teacher (self-relevant details) but place them in 
the context of the individual's back yard (incorrect context). Therefore, self-relevant 
details may enhance recognition of an unremembered event, to the degree that they fit 
with other details as well as with the overall narrative context. 
This leads to an alternate explanation which can be offered for this apparent dual 
nature of self-relevant details. It may be that it is not the self-relevant details themselves 
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that become restrictive, or constraining. Instead, it may be the case that any given detail 
has both self-relevant and constraining qualities. These qualities vary such that one may 
outweigh the other. If a detail is higher in constraint that in self-relevance, fluency will be 
impeded, resulting in reduced likelihood that an unremembered event were accepted as 
being true. If, on the other hand, the more a detail is self-relevant, the more likely it will 
promote fluency and lead to the generation of subsequent self-relevant details. Another 
way to look at this is that a given detail can either result in both a degree of cognitive 
dissonance and a degree of cognitive consonance. This will dictate the type of retrieval 
model that is generated by the working self, resulting in either acceptance or rejection of 
the detail as true; and the summation of such details within the event to determining 
whether a false event as a whole is true. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider the characteristics of details described above 
and examine how different details relate to one another, based on how they differ in their 
relative amounts of self-relevance and constraint. Using the hot-air balloon example used 
in the present study, three main details were isolated: the hot-air balloon, the participant 
with his or her parent, and the background against which the event took place. Each of 
these details contained a balance of self-relevance and constraint, with some details 
containing more or less of either. Four conditions thus emerged based on the relative 
levels of the detail types: 1) non-self-relevant and non-constrained, 2) self-relevant and 
non-constrained, 3) non-self-relevant and constrained, and 4) self-relevant and 
constrained. Each condition contained the same three details mentioned above, however 
the background and the presence of the participant with his or her parent were altered so 
as to vary the relative levels of self-relevance and constraint contained therein (Appendix 
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A). The hot-air balloon was present in all of the conditions, as it depicts the type of event. 
The two non-self-relevant conditions both contained a picture of a group of people inside 
the hot-air balloon with a flashbulb effect obscuring the identities of the two people in the 
foreground, such that their identities were unknown. The two self-relevant conditions 
both contained the same group of people inside the hot-air balloon, but the picture 
revealed a clear shot of the participant posing with his or her parent. The background was 
neutral in the unconstrained conditions, depicting a plain gray sky. In the constrained 
conditions, the background depicted a lighthouse among some shrubbery. This 
background was constraining because it was unfamiliar to the participant, and would be 
dissonant with his or her self-concept, thus impeding fluency of processing. 
Using photographs and brief descriptions of their content that were provided by 
the participants' parents, participants were interviewed three times according to the 
protocol used in Desjardins and Scoboria (2007). The target event selected was taking a 
hot-air balloon ride before the age of six. Of the photographs sent by the parents, three 
were selected to compose a personalized booklet that was used in the interviews and 
given to the participant for use between interviews. An additional photograph was 
doctored according to the conditions created by the two levels of each independent 
variable as described above and was placed third in the sequence of photographs. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. It was predicted that higher rates of false memory formation would 
be rated as having occurred by judges upon exposure to self-relevant photographs or non-
constrained photographs, with the self-relevant detail conditions producing higher rates. 
This was based on the observation that in the self-relevant conditions, participants were 
25 
given a springboard from which to start generating their own self-relevant details to flesh 
out potential memory formation. In the non-constrained photograph condition, they were 
not given such a starting point, but they were also not restricted in their ability to generate 
self-relevant details to assist them in attempting to "remember" the events in the 
photographs. It was further predicted that constraint and self-relevance would interact, 
such that the highest rates of false memories would occur when self-relevant details were 
paired with non-constrained details (see Fig 1). 
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Figure 1. Predicted rates of false memories formed as a factor of varying details 










• N on-self-relevant 
•Self-relevant 
Constraining Non-constraining 
Level of Constraint 
Note: Percentages are illustrative of the predicted pattern of results; the specific rates and 
magnitude of differences are not predicted. 
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Hypothesis 2. It was predicted that higher magnitudes of subjective memory 
ratings would occur in the self-relevant detail conditions as well as in the non-constrained 
detail conditions, with the self-relevant detail conditions producing higher rates. It was 
further predicted that the highest magnitude of subjective memory ratings would occur 
when self-relevance and constraint interact. However, subjective autobiographical belief 
ratings would not differ across conditions. This was based on the assumption that telling 
the participants that the photographs were provided by their parents was a strong belief 
manipulation; and was consistent with data from Desjardins and Scoboria (2007). 
Hypothesis 3. It was predicted that higher ratings of memory quality would occur 
in the self-relevant detail conditions as well as in the non-constrained detail conditions, 
with the self-relevant detail conditions producing higher rates. It was further predicted 
that the highest ratings of memory quality would occur when self-relevance and 
constraint interact. 
Hypothesis 4. It was predicted that when participants were asked to identify which 
of the four events are false, those who were in the non-self-relevant conditions and 
constrained conditions would be most likely to guess incorrectly. Those who were in the 
self-relevant/unconstrained condition would be least able to guess which event is false. 
This was based on Desjardins and Scoboria's (2007) findings when employing the same 




Participants and Setting 
Seventy-six undergraduate students (19 male, 57 female; between the ages of 17-
24; M = 19.5, SD = 1.8) recruited from the University of Windsor Psychology 
Department participant pool consented and participated in this study. Of the participants 
invited to participate, 160 provided their parents' contact information. Eighty-two 
responses from parents were received, two of which needed to be disqualified due to 
having actually taken a hot air balloon ride as a child. Four participants failed to 
participate in all three interviews. Participants received credits for participation as part of 
their course requirements for introductory psychology courses, and were entered in a 
raffle for 6 prizes of $50. 
Design and Materials 
Soliciting information from parents. Participants' parents were contacted by mail 
for the purpose of obtaining photographs of the participant before they were of age six. 
Parents were given a list of themes to assist in selecting photographs (e.g birthday parties, 
barbecues, family outings, etc). Parents were requested to select pictures that contained 
groups of people in social situations, and to the degree possible, photographs that the 
participant had not seen before. For each photograph, parents were asked to provide a 
brief narrative of what is occurring in the picture. Furthermore, parents were asked 
whether to their knowledge their child has ever taken a hot air balloon in their life. 
Parents were guaranteed that the photographs they provide were returned to them in the 
original condition provided. 
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Upon receipt, the materials were reviewed. If appropriate for the study, four 
photographs were selected from those provided, and were scanned into a computer file. 
One of the four photographs was doctored using Adobe Photoshop®. All photographs 
were accompanied by a one-line description of the event depicted and at what age the 
participant was when the event occurred. A booklet was created, which contained four 
photographs for each participant, one photograph on each page. The photographs were 
black and white. Participants were told that this is the case because the photographs 
submitted needed to be scanned, digitalized, and returned to their parents in good 
condition and that the printer used only enabled black and white printing. 
After photographs were received, participants were scheduled for an initial 
session. Prior to the first session, participants were randomly assigned to conditions, 
according to the two levels of each independent variable (self-relevant/non-self-relevant 
details and constraining/non-constraining details). Therefore, the conditions were as 
follows: non-self-relevant and non-constrained, non-self-relevant and constrained, self-
relevant and non-constrained, and self-relevant and constrained. Self-relevant details are 
defined as "information highly unique to the participant", such as the face of a family 
member (Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007). Constraining details are defined as limiting the 
freedom to experience familiarity about an unremembered event. 
The configuration of detail in photographs is depicted in Table 1. The non-self-
relevant and non-constrained condition contained the hot-air balloon against a neutral 
background that contains no perceptual details (only the sky as visible). Inside the hot air-
balloon there was a group of people, but they were shaded in a manner such that their 
identities were unknown. The self-relevant and non-constrained condition contained the 
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hot-air balloon against a neutral backdrop. Inside the hot-air balloon there were a group 
of people, among which there was a clear shot of the participant posing with his or her 
parent. The non-self-relevant and constrained condition contained the hot-air balloon 
against a backdrop that was unfamiliar to the participant. Inside the hot-air balloon there 
were a group of people, but they were shaded in a manner such that their identities were 
unknown. Finally, the self-relevant and constrained condition contained the hot-air 
balloon against a backdrop that was unfamiliar to the participant. Inside the hot-air 
balloon there were a group of people, among which there was a clear shot of the 
participant posing with his or her parent. 
Autobiographical Belief and Memory Questionnaire (ABMQ). Participants 
completed the Autobiographical Belief and Memory Questionnaire (Scoboria, Mazzoni, 
Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004; Appendix B) in order to provide information about their 
subjective memory experience. This questionnaire assesses general and personal 
plausibility (where 1 = not at all plausible, and 8 = extremely plausible); autobiographical 
belief (where 1 = definitely did not happen and 8 = definitely did happen); and 
autobiographical memory (where 1 = no memory for the event at all and 8 = clear and 
complete memory for the event). This measure was employed as in Desjardins & 
Scoboria (2007). Participants were asked to rate each of these constructs for five different 
events. The first, fourth and fifth events were the same for all of the participants (choking 
on an object, bone density screening, seeing a UFO). One of the participants' true events 
was placed second and the hot-air balloon ride false event was placed third. This was 
done so that the false event would not stand out. Research on the ABMQ has found that 
individuals are able to distinguish these constructs within events, and that events vary in 
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the level of each construct (Scoboria et al, 2004). Furthermore, ratings tend to remain 
relatively stable when not manipulated across 2 week periods of time and change as 
as predicted when manipulated (Scoboria et al., 2006). 
Judges' ratings. Based upon the transcripts from the first and third interviews, 
participants were classified by two independent judges (a procedure consistent with 
Lindsay et al. 2004), who are blind to the experimental condition, as having either (1) no 
images; (2) images only; or (3) memories for each of the four events, according to 
Lindsay et al's (2004) criteria. The purpose of these ratings was to determine if rates of 
false memory formation would vary as a function of objective ratings of participant 
narratives. This further allows for the comparison of the quality of verbal output (as 
judged) with subjective memory ratings. Participants who report actual memories were 
coded into the memory category, whereas those who describe images associated with the 
event, but not definitive memories, were classified in the images category. Images 
constituted only reporting what the participant saw in the photograph and describing 
where the event may have taken place. Memories constituted reporting what the 
participant saw, but also adding descriptions of what they may have been thinking and 
feeling what it may have been like to have experienced the event. The judges were two 
research assistants employed in the lab. They were trained for coding using sample event 
transcripts until an inter-rater agreement of 90% was obtained. The judges attained an 
inter-rater agreement of 88% on the actual transcripts; disagreements were resolved 
through discussion. 
Memory Characteristics Questions. Participants also rated the quality of 
memories for all of the events depicted in the photographs they saw using questions 
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Table 1. 
The four experimental conditions and an example of how they were created (See 
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Garry and Wade (2005) adapted from Bernstein, Willert, and Rubin (2003). The 
purpose of this measure was to provide more information about phenomenological 
characteristics which are associated with autobiographical memory. On a 7-point scale (1 
= low, 7 = high), participants rated whether they could: (1) relive the event in their mind; 
(2) see the event in their mind; (3) hear the event in their mind; (4) feel emotions 
associated with the event; (5) remember the event rather than just know that it happened; 
(6) remember the event as a coherent story; (7) believe the event occurred in the way 
remembered; and (8) whether they had talked/thought about the event in the past. 
Procedure 
All procedures were approved by the University of Windsor Research Ethics 
Board. Participants that met the screening criteria were asked to provide parental contact 
information, and were told that their parents were contacted for the purpose of obtaining 
non-sensitive information about their childhoods. Once parents provide the information, 
four photographs were selected to make up the individual participant booklets. 
Participants were interviewed three times over the course of one week, according to 
Garry and Wade's (2005) procedure, as depicted in Table 2. Interviews, which were 
approximately 30 minutes in duration, were conducted by four research assistants who 
were blind to the hypotheses of the study. Efforts were made to balance administration so 
that each research assistant interviewed participants assigned to each of the four 
conditions. Research assistants were provided with a script which they were asked to 
follow verbatim. Adherence to the script was ensured by practicing, and by reviewing the 
audiotaped interviews conducted by the research assistants. 
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Table 2. 
Timeline and content of the three interviews 
Interview #1 Interview #2 Interview #3 
Told photos provided by 
parents. 
Asked to provide maximum 
details. 




Asked to provide maximum 
details. 
Guided imagery if event not 
remembered. 
Asked to provide maximum 
details 






During the first interview, participants were told that the purpose of the study was 
to evaluate the effectiveness of memory recovery techniques on memory for childhood 
events. They were told that their parents provided the photographs and a brief description 
of what was going on in each. The photographs were ordered so that the first, second and 
fourth are true events and the third is the false event, consistent with false memory 
research paradigms to date. The ordering of photographs in this manner also facilitates 
the comparison of false memory formation rate between studies. After each photograph, 
and with the photograph remaining in front of them, the participant was asked to describe 
everything they could remember about the event depicted therein without leaving 
anything out. If the participant did not remember the event, he or she was reassured that 
many people have difficulty remembering events that happened such a long time ago 
because they have not thought about them. Participants were instructed to concentrate for 
a few minutes, and to try to bring the event into focus. They were told to close their eyes 
and try to imagine that they were back in the situation depicted in the photograph. They 
were encouraged to focus on the details of the event, such as what they may have felt that 
day, what it may have been like to experience the event, who was with them, the season. 
Then they were asked what, if anything, they can remember. If they cannot remember 
any details, the next photograph was introduced and the above procedure was repeated. 
Participants' recollections were audio recorded during the first and last interviews for the 
purposes of transcription and scoring of inter-rater agreement on the extent to which the 
participants' descriptions constituted either (1) no images; (2) images only; or (3) 
memories. 
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Once participants were unable to remember any more details about each of the 
photographs, they were asked to fill out the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire to 
describe the quality of the memories they had for each event. They were given the 
personalized booklet containing their photographs, and were asked to review it once 
daily, spending a few minutes per photograph, to try to remember the events contained in 
the photographs. Participants were also instructed not to discuss the events in their 
booklet with anyone during the course of the study. 
The subsequent interviews followed the same format as the first. After imagining 
each event, participants were asked to describe any details remembered. If no new 
information was remembered, the research assistant proceeded to the next event. The 
memory questionnaire was not administered during Interview 2 because interest was 
primarily in memory characteristics immediately after the first interview and again at the 
end of the experiment. Additionally, this allows for Interview 2 to be fairly brief as 
compared to the other two interviews. After Interview 3, once participants complete the 
memory questionnaire, they were asked to complete the ABMQ. They were then asked 
how frequently they thought about events during the study, and whether they discussed 
any of the events with others. Participants were then told that one of the events was false, 
and the research assistant asked them to select which of the events they thought was false. 




Overall images and memories formed 
Analysis of judges' ratings of interview transcripts found that at Time 2, 12.4% of 
participants were judged to have true memories for the false event, compared to 2.7% at 
Time 1. Furthermore, 33.3% of participants were judged to have generated images or 
memories at Time 2, as compared to 24.7% at Time 1. These rates were not statistically 
different. 
Judges' ratings 
Logistic Regression was used to analyze the frequencies of the judges' ratings of 
interview transcripts (see Table 3). Main effects for self-relevance and constraint were 
hypothesized, whereby non-constraining details and self-relevant details would yield a 
higher false memory formation rate than constraining and non-self relevant details, 
respectively. Additionally, it was hypothesized that self-relevant details paired with non-
constraining details would yield the highest false memory formation rate. At both Time 1 
and Time 2, analyses revealed no significant main effects or interactions, thus the 
hypotheses were not supported. Specifically, at Time 1, 27% of participants in the self-
relevant conditions generated images or memories as compared to 21.6% in the non-self 
relevant conditions (B = 0.801, SE= .745, Wald = 1.155,/? = .283, Exp(B) = 2.227). At 
Time 2, 36.1% of participants in the self-relevant conditions reported images or 
memories for the false event, as compared to 30.5% of participants in the non-self-
relevant conditions (B = 1.030, SE= .739, Wald = 1.940,/? = .164, Exp(B) = 2.80). In 
terms of constraint, logistic regression at Time 1 revealed that 31.4% of participants in 
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Table 3 
Percentage of image and memory formation per judge's ratings by experimental 
condition and time 
Time 1 Time 2 




None Images Memories None Images Memories 
76.47% 23.53% 0.00% 76.47% 11.76% 11.76% 
61.11% 33.33% 5.56% 52.94% 28.41% 18.65% 
Non-Self-Relevant, 8Q QQ% l 5 Q O o / o 50QO/o 63.16% 21.05% 15.79% 
Constrained 
Self-Relevant, 83.33% 16.67% 0.00% 73.68% 21.05% 5.27% 
Constrained 
Note: Non self-relevant, non-constrained, n at Tl = 17, n at T2 = 17; Self-relevant, non-
constrained, n at Tl = 18, n at T2 = 17; Non self-relevant, constrained, n at Tl = 20, n at 
T2 = 19; Self-relevant, constrained, n at Tl = 18, n at T2 = 19. 
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the non-constrained conditions generated images or memories as compared to 18.4% in 
the constrained conditions (B = -0.134, SE = .796, Wald = 0.028,/? = .867, Exp(B) = 
.875). At Time 2, 31.6% of participants in the non-constrained conditions reported 
images or memories for the false event, as compared to 35.3% in the constrained 
conditions (B = 0.634 , SE = 0.736, Wald = 0.742,p = .389, Exp(B) = 1.885). 
Autobiographical Belief and Memory Questionnaire (ABMQ) 
Judge's ratings provide an objective evaluation of false memory formation. They 
do not, however, take into consideration the participants' subjective evaluations of their 
memory for the target event. Hypotheses for main and interaction effects on these ratings 
were the same as for the objective judges' ratings. Analysis of ABMQ memory ratings 
after the third interview using a factorial between-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant 
interaction effect for self-relevant and non-constraining details, F (1, 72) = 7.62,/? < .01), 
Cohen's d= 0.78 (see Figure 2 and Table 4); there was no significant main effect for self-
relevance (p > 0.1). Whereas the main effect for constraint was approaching significance 
(p = 0.05), this was found to be driven by the interaction. Therefore, hypotheses 
regarding main effects were not supported. Planned comparisons using Mann-Whitney U 
tests were performed. This non-parametric test was employed because the data violated 
the assumptions of normality and of homogeneity of variance necessary for parametric 
tests. Analyses revealed that the condition in which self-relevant details were paired with 
non-constraining details generated significantly higher memory ratings than the 
remaining conditions (U= 361.5/? < .05), thus supporting the hypothesis. Additionally, 
the self-relevant, non-constrained condition was significantly higher than both of the 
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Table 4: 
Means and standard deviation for all Autobiographical Belief and Memory 
Questionnaire (ABMQ) variables at Time 2 
General Personal R r f M 
Plausibility Plausibility 
„ ,.t. Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Condition 
Non self-relevant, 4.44 2.36 4.44 2.36 4.11 2.52 1.44 0.84 
Non-constrained 
Self-Relevant, 5.39 1.94 5.22 2.46 4.72 2.76 2.72 2.23 
Non-Constrained 
Non-Self-Relevant, 4.20 1.58 4.85 2.06 4.90 2.51 1.70 1.22 
Constrained 
Self-Relevant, 5.25 1.93 4.90 2.22 4.55 2.87 1.20 0.52 
Constrained 
Note: Non self-relevant, non-constrained n = 18; Self-relevant, non-constrained n = 18; 
Non self-relevant, constrained = 20; Self-Relevant, Constrained n = 20. 
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Figure 2. Mean memory rating on the Autobiographical Belief and Memory 



















constrained conditions (U = 251.5 p< .05), as well as from the self-relevant constrained 
condition (U= 108.5, p <.05). There were no significant differences found between 
groups on plausibility and belief ratings (all/7 > .10). 
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ) 
Analyses of the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (see Appendix G) ratings 
were conducted using 2x2x2 mixed factorial ANOVAs with the experimental factors as 
between-subjects variables and Time as a within subjects factor. Hypotheses for main and 
interaction effects on these ratings were the same as for the objective judges' ratings and 
for the ABMQ ratings. Full analyses for each item are provided in the subsequent 
paragraphs. For the purposes of brevity, only items with significant findings are 
presented. To summarize the notable findings, significant increases in memory quality 
rating between Time 1 and Time 2 were observed for all items, excepting items 5 
(remember rather than know) and 8 (talked/thought about event). Significant main effects 
for constraint were found on items 2 (see) and 4 (feel emotions), showing that 
participants in the non-constrained conditions gave higher ratings than those in the 
constrained conditions for these items, consistent with the hypotheses. Three-way 
interactions were found for items 3 (hear), 6 (coherent story), and 7 (believe), which were 
due to significant differences being found between groups at Time 2, but not at Time 1. 
The pattern for these three items at Time 2 was similar: participants in the self-relevant, 
non-constrained and non-self-relevant, constrained conditions gave higher ratings than 
did those in the self-relevant, constrained condition. The former finding was consistent 
with the hypotheses, whereas the latter finding was not. The specifics of each analysis are 
discussed below. 
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For items 2 (i.e. see the event) and 4 (i.e. feel emotions), a significant main effect 
for constraint was found, F (1, 72) = 4.1 \,p < .05, and F ( l , 72) = 3.72,/? < 0.06, 
respectively. Participants in the non-constrained conditions gave higher ratings than those 
in the constrained conditions. 
For item 3 (i.e. hear the event) a significant 3-way interaction between time, self-
relevance and constraint was found, F ( l , 72) = 6.44, p < 0.05. The interaction was found 
to be due to a lack of significant differences between groups at Time 1, whereas there 
were differences at Time 2. A univariate 2X2 ANOVA at Time 1 with self-relevance and 
constraint as factors, revealed no significant effects (all/7 > .10). A similar analysis at 
Time 2 found a significant interaction between self-relevance and constraint, F ( l , 72) = 
9.29, p < 0.05. Independent sample t-tests revealed that participants in the self-relevant, 
non-constrained group gave higher ratings than those in both the non-self-relevant, non-
constrained group, t (34) = 2.07, p < 0.05, and the self-relevant, constrained group, t (36) 
= 3.02, p < 0.05. Furthermore, participants in the non-self-relevant, constrained group 
gave higher ratings than those in the self-relevant, constrained group, i (38) = 2.29, p < 
0.05. A paired t-test revealed that only the self-relevant, non-constrained group increased 
significantly from Time 1 to Time 2, t (17) = 2.83,/? < 0.05. 
For item 5 (i.e. You remember the event rather than just know that it happened), 
factorial between-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant interaction effect between self-
relevance and constraint F (1, 72) = 4.64,/? < 0.05. Univariate 2x2 ANOVAs were run 
for both Time 1 and Time 2. At Time 1, there were no significant main effects, nor 
significant interactions. At Time 2, there was a significant interaction between self-
relevance and constraint, F(\, 72) = 5.32,/? < 0.05. However, planned comparisons using 
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t-tests revealed no significant differences between groups (all/? > .10), meaning that the 
interaction in this case was a statistical artifact. 
For item 6 (i.e. coherent story) a significant 3-way interaction between time, self-
relevance and constraint was found between subjects, F(l, 72) = 4.59,p < 0.05. To 
determine whether time was influencing the 3-way interaction, univariate 2X2 ANOVAs 
for each time point were performed. No significant main effects were found at either time 
point. However, a marginal interaction effect was found at Time 2, F ( l , 72) = 3.69,/? < 
0.06. Independent sample t-tests revealed that participants in the self-relevant, non-
constrained group gave higher ratings than those in the self-relevant, constrained group, t 
(36) = 2.49,/? < 0.05. Furthermore, participants in the non-self-relevant, constrained 
group gave higher ratings than those in the self-relevant, constrained group, t (38) = 
2.30,/? < 0.05. Paired t-tests revealed that only the non-self-relevant, constrained group 
increased significantly from Time 1 to Time 2, t (19) = 2.93, p < 0.05. 
For Item 7 (i.e. occurred way remembered) a significant 3-way interaction 
between time, self-relevance and constraint was found between subjects, F{\, 72) = 5.82, 
/? < 0.05. Examining the group mean plots at each time point appeared to indicate that 
ratings on this item increased from Time 1 to Time 2. Univariate 2X2 ANOVAs for each 
time point were performed. No significant main effects or interaction effects were found 
at Time 1. At Time 2, there was a significant interaction between self-relevance and 
constraint, F (1, 72) = 4.05,/? < 0.05). Independent sample t-tests at Time 2 revealed that 
participants in the self-relevant, non-constrained group gave higher ratings than those in 
the self-relevant, constrained group, t (36) = 2.46,/? < 0.05. Furthermore, participants in 
the non-self-relevant, constrained group gave higher ratings than those in the self-
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relevant, constrained group, / (38) = 2.07, p = 0.05. Paired t-tests comparing each of the 
groups across time revealed that participants in the self-relevant, non-constrained group 
gave significantly higher rating on this item, t (17) = 3.34,/? < 0.05, as did those in the 
non-self-relevant, constrained group, / (19) = 2.94, p < 0.05. 
Participants' guesses 
Finally, in terms of participants' guesses about which photograph was false at the 
end of the third interview, only two participants guessed incorrectly. Interestingly, both 
were in the self-relevant, non-constrained group. This resulted in an incorrect guess rate 
of 11.11% for this group, and 0% in the other groups. All of the other participants 




Consistent with predictions, individuals who received self-relevant information 
without associated constraining information in photographs provided the highest memory 
ratings for a false childhood event. However, predicted differences in judge's ratings of 
events as memories were not observed. Groups showed statistically equal false memory 
formation rates at both time points, achieving an overall images rate of 20.9% and 
memory rate of 12.4%. This suggests that, at least with respect to the ABMQ subjective 
memory ratings, the self-relevant, non-constrained condition provided the most optimal 
environment for false memory formation of all of the conditions tested. Participants are 
provided with a self-relevant detail that likely promotes feelings of familiarity, leading to 
fluency of processing, which is not impeded by the presentation of unfamiliar (i.e. 
constraining) details. The frequencies of images or memories generated for the false 
event by participants in the self-relevant conditions were approximately half of those 
generated in Desjardins and Scoboria (2007). This was expected, as photographs are 
more constraining than narratives, and thus limit the overall ability for individuals to 
imagine additional details when trying to remember and event. In terms of other studies 
which employed photographs (e.g. Wade et al., 2002; Garry & Wade, 2005) the overall 
judgement of images or memories found at Time 2 in the present study was lower (i.e. 
-33% versus -50%). This is particularly interesting as the self-relevant, constrained 
condition in this study was identical to the doctored photograph condition in both of these 
studies. A possible explanation is that individuals are becoming increasingly aware of 
47 
digital imaging technology, which increases the likelihood that they will become 
skeptical as to the veracity of the photograph and thus may reject the event more readily. 
The discrepancy between the judges' ratings and the participants own ratings of 
their memory experiences highlight the importance of including these two measures when 
assessing false memory formation. Although outside observers may not judge a given 
response as constituting either an image or a memory, the extent to which an individual 
perceives him or herself to remember an event carries a significant amount of weight in 
both judicial and therapeutic settings. A possible reason for the discrepancy between 
objective and subjective ratings may be that, whereas participants in the different 
conditions were exposed to different stimuli, and may have felt as though they 
remembered the event to varying degrees, these feelings of remembering (or not 
remembering) may not have been expressed in a manner that can be coded by raters. 
Therefore, a given participant may have felt confident that they "remembered" the event, 
but this subjective experience, while resulting in high memory ratings, did not manifest 
itself in rich descriptive detail about the event that could have been judged as constituting 
an image or a memory. 
The subjective Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ) ratings were 
expected to mirror the Autobiographical Belief and Memory (ABMQ) ratings. The MCQ 
measure was introduced as an exploratory devise in order to help understand the factors 
which influenced memory ratings. On the ABMQ, participants give a rating 
corresponding to the degree of memory they feel they have for the given event. The 
MCQ, on the other hand, breaks down the experience of remembering into a variety of 
component parts (e.g. visual imagery, emotional content, event coherence), each of which 
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may be experienced differently by participants. Thus, ratings on this measure can help 
explain in a more qualitative way the mental experience of the participants as they engage 
in the memory recovery task. 
Visual imagery and emotional content are two of the primary characteristics 
associated with rich autobiographical memories (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007). It is thus 
interesting that the two MCQ items that specifically addressed seeing the event and 
feeling emotions associated with the event where associated with unique effects for 
constraint but not self-relevance. This may be due to the fact that a visual stimulus (i.e. a 
photograph) is being used as the suggestive medium, thus making it more susceptible to 
constraint effects. When details are provided visually it is harder for an individual to 
ignore or modify them if they appear unfamiliar or constraining when trying to remember 
the event in question. As such it may be more difficult to be able to visualize an event in 
one's mind and experience emotions associated with the event, when part of the stimulus 
provided to aide remembering contains something that does not "match" with one's 
autobiographical history. 
Other items showed a different pattern. Hearing, event coherence, and belief in 
occurrence were influenced by both self-relevance and constraint at Time 2. Participants 
in the self-relevant, non-constrained condition gave higher ratings than did those in the 
self-relevant, constrained condition. This finding supports the original hypothesis, and is 
similar to the pattern of results found in the ABMQ Memory ratings. However, 
participants in the non-self-relevant, constrained condition gave higher ratings than those 
in the self-relevant, constrained condition, which was not expected. It was originally 
hypothesized that the opposite would be the case, or at the very least that these conditions 
would generate similar ratings. This is because participants in the self-relevant, 
constrained condition are at least given a springboard to jumpstart the feelings of 
familiarity (via the provision of the self-relevant detail) that would lead to surprising 
fluency of processing. Those in the non-self-relevant condition are not given such a 
springboard, while at the same time are impeded from developing any fluency of 
processing due to the presence constraining detail. A possible explanation for this 
unexpected result is that, as mentioned above, a constraining detail impedes fluency of 
processing.. It cannot be ignored or modified with ease when trying to remember an 
event. This in particular may be the case in photographic form versus narrative form, 
because the former is a much more vivid and salient stimulus. As such, the unfamiliar 
constraining detail is much more conspicuous, and cannot be easily dismissed. For this 
same reason, self-relevant details may have a lesser effect in a photographic medium than 
in a narrative medium. For example, when a person hears "your mother", which is a self-
relevant detail, they can imagine their mother in many different ways. When they are 
shown a picture of their mother, the picture may be taken from an angle that is 
unfamiliar, or the mother may be dressed/coiffed in a way that is not familiar to the 
individual. Thus, the photographically depicted self-relevant detail loses some of its 
power in arousing feelings of familiarity. Participants who are shown a photograph in 
which they can clearly see themselves and their parent, while at the same time are shown 
an unfamiliar detail, may have a harder time being able to remember. On the other hand, 
participants who are shown a picture with an unfamiliar detail, and not shown a clear 
picture of themselves and their parent are free to imagine what they may have looked 
like, what their parent may have looked like, what they may have been wearing, what 
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their facial expression may have been like, and the like. Therefore, these participants 
have the ability to develop feelings of familiarity to a greater extent, hence explaining 
why the mean ratings obtained from the participants in this group were greater than those 
obtained from participants in the self-relevant constrained group. 
The explanation provided above can also be used to explain why coherence and 
belief were influenced by both self-relevant and constraint at Time 2, and not Time 1. 
Specifically, those in the self-relevant, non-constrained group could have an easier time 
believing that the event is true because the self-relevant details are not impeded in their 
role of arousing feelings of familiarity, due to the absence of constraining details. Those 
in the non-self-relevant, constrained condition can have an equally easy time believing 
that the event occurred as it did because the self-relevant detail, although not shown in 
the photograph, is suggested by the fact that the participant is told that their mother/father 
is posing with them. Therefore, they can imagine their parents however they wish, which 
may overpower the effect of the constraining detail on this item alone. Also, their belief 
that the event occurred the way it did is bolstered by the fact that they are told that all of 
the photographs were provided by their parents. Believing the event occurred as it did is 
related to how coherent the story of the event may be - the more coherent the story 
appears to be, the more likely that the event will be believed. The participants were 
interviewed three times over the course of one week, during each of which they were 
engaged in an intense memory recovery task. Additionally, the participants were asked to 
think about the photographs between interviews. Such frequent rehearsal can make an 
event appear more and more like a coherent story, which can in turn make it more 
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believable. These factors likely take time to develop, which is perhaps why significant 
differences were not found until the final interview. 
Relationship between self-relevant and constrained details 
Subjective Reports. Thus, it appears as though the properties of self-relevant and 
constraining details operate in specific manners when presented in photographic form. As 
described above, the power of self-relevant details may be reduced, because the detail is 
presented in only one way, which may not necessarily be as familiar to the individual as it 
would be if they were free to imagine it for themselves. Constraining details, on the other 
hand, may be more powerful as agents that impede fluency of processing, due to the fact 
that they are less easily modified or ignored by the individual when he or she is trying to 
remember the event. Additionally, it may be the case that self-relevant details are only 
weakened if presented along with a constraining detail. This is because the constraining 
detail draws the viewer's attention in a negative way and lowers fluency of processing to 
such an extent (or is so dissonant with the individual's working self concept) that the 
individual may come to reject the event as true. In their attempt to ensure that they are 
correct in rejecting the veracity of the event, the individual may scrutinize other details in 
the photograph, and may view the self-relevant detail as less familiar. When no 
constraining detail is present, the self-relevant detail (which is consistent with the 
individual's autobiographical history) may be allowed to exert its full power in arousing 
feelings of familiarity because there is nothing present to impede their formation. 
Whittlesea and Leboe (2003) posited that fluency of processing may influence 
individuals' decision making by either increasing absolute fluency (i.e. speed of 
processing a stimulus is greater than for other, similar stimuli) or by increasing relative 
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fluency (i.e. speed of processing a stimulus produces a discrepancy between actual speed 
of processing and expected speed of processing). The researchers went on to conclude 
that the critical element in arousing feelings of familiarity is not the actual increase in 
fluency on its own, but the perception of surprise when a stimulus is processed faster than 
expected. 
Using the hot-air balloon event, when individuals encounter this stimulus, they 
may initially not expect to remember the event. However, in the context of being told that 
the event happened and seeing themselves and their parent arouses feelings of familiarity 
which they mistakenly attribute to the entire event. Therefore, they process the stimulus 
more fluently than they initially expected, which can facilitate their acceptance of the 
event as true. This is precisely what appears to be occurring in the self-relevant, non-
constrained condition. In the non-self-relevant, constrained condition, where the 
constraining detail is provided alone, the individual may either attempt to use this detail 
to help their "remembering", or they can choose to ignore it when they are trying to 
remember the target event. After all, the detail may be unfamiliar, but so is the entire 
target event. As such, when the individual is attempting to remember the event, they can 
easily amalgamate the individual detail (i.e. the lighthouse in this case) along with the 
entire hot-air balloon ride event. Thus, the process of remembering is certainly not 
facilitated (i.e. no self-relevant detail is provided), but it is perhaps not impeded as much 
when the constraining detail is presented alone (i.e. without a self-relevant detail). This is 
because the constraining detail may not be as comparatively constraining relative to the 
entire target event. The event itself is unfamiliar, so when an unfamiliar detail is 
presented within an unfamiliar context, it may not jump out to the viewer as being as "out 
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of place" as it would if the context were familiar (or made more familiar via the 
presentation of a self-relevant detail). 
In the case where a self-relevant detail is paired with a constraining detail, a 
conflict of processing may occur. Upon seeing the self-relevant detail, the individual 
recognizes themselves and their parent, and thus experiences surprising fluency as 
compared to what they initially expected to experience. However, the constraining detail 
by comparison is much more relatively constraining, and impedes the fluency of 
processing. Thus, the individual experiences a surprising disfluency of processing (i.e. 
they recognize themselves and their parent, and therefore expect to recognize the entire 
event, but for some reason, they do not). Therefore, they experience a fluency of 
processing disproportionately smaller than expected, resulting in a decrease in confidence 
that the event occurred, which could lead to the event being rejected. 
In terms of the non-self-relevant, non-constrained condition, none of these fluency 
promoting or fluency impeding forces are at play, which may explain why this group was 
not statistically different from any other group besides the self-relevant, non-constrained 
group. 
These findings can also be interpreted in terms of Conway and Pleydell-Pearce's 
(2000) self-concept theory, which maintains that over time, individuals develop sets of 
self-schemas, which consist of memory representations of different concepts of the "self. 
Different subsets of these schemas are active at any given time, and form what they term 
the individual's "working self concept", the goal of which is to maintain cognitive 
consonance. Therefore, any new information remembered and subsequently retrieved 
needs to be consistent with an individual's sense of self. They argue that the goal of the 
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working self to maintain cognitive consonance is what dictates the memory retrieval 
models generated when an individual attempts to recall an event from the past. If a 
stimulus presented as a memory cue is consonant with an individual's working self-
concept, then the memory retrieval model generated will facilitate the search for that 
memory. If, however, the stimulus presented is dissonant with the working self concept, 
the memory retrieval model generated will constrain the search for the memory. 
In the present study, the photograph depicting the false event (i.e. a stimulus 
dissonant with the individual's working self concept) was constant across experimental 
conditions. Therefore, the only factors at play are the different types of details included in 
the photographs, depending on the condition. Using Conway and Pleydell-Pearce's 
(2000) model, participants in the self-relevant, non-constrained condition were provided 
with a memory cue stimulus that is more likely to be consonant with their working self 
concept (i.e. themselves and their parent). There is nothing in the photograph that is 
dissonant with their working self-concept (besides the event itself, of course, which as 
mentioned above is held constant across experimental groups). Thus, the memory 
retrieval model generated to search the autobiographical memory base would be quite 
broad, although specific to memories where the parent depicted in the picture is present. 
In the self-relevant, constrained condition, there are two memory cue stimuli: one 
that is consonant with the individual's working self-concept (i.e. the self-relevant detail), 
and one that is dissonant with it (i.e. the constraining detail). Thus, the memory retrieval 
model generated would have been the narrowest of all the conditions, in that the 
instructions are to search for all instances where a particular parent was present, while 
also having a lighthouse present in the background. 
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In the non-self-relevant, constrained condition, the constraining detail is provided 
alone and represents a memory cue stimulus that is dissonant with the individual's 
working self concept. However, because there are no memory cues provided other than 
those that are constant across conditions (i.e. telling participants that their parents 
provided the photograph of them), the memory search model generated here will be 
broader than that generated in the self-relevant, constrained condition. Thus, ratings on 
the AMBQ and the three items on the MCQ listed above were understandably higher in 
the non-self-relevant, constrained condition than in the self-relevant constrained 
condition. Nevertheless, the memory retrieval model generated in the former condition is 
still narrower than that generated in the self-relevant, non-constrained condition. The 
reason for this is because the memory cue stimulus in the former condition is more likely 
to be dissonant with the individual's working self concept (i.e. unfamiliar lighthouse), 
whereas the memory cue stimulus in the latter condition is consonant with it (i.e. picture 
of self with parent). 
Perhaps photographically presented self-relevant details promote false memory 
formation when they appear without the presence of constraining details. If they are 
presented along with a constraining detail, at least two processes may become activated, 
either of which will result in decreased memory ratings on subjective measures. Using 
Whittlesea's (1993) fluency of processing model, when self-relevant details are paired 
with constraining details, two opposing forces are at play: one that promotes and one that 
impedes fluency of processing. This results in a processing speed that is 
disproportionately smaller than expected by the individual, which can be interpreted to 
mean that the event is not familiar, leading to a rejection of the event as true. Using 
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Conway and Pleydell-Pearce's (2000) working self concept model, pairing self-relevant 
details with constraining details results in the generation of a more narrow memory 
search model, which reduces the likelihood that the event will be endorsed as being true. 
Judges' Ratings. The judges' ratings, on the other hand, provide an objective 
evaluation of the narrative quality of event descriptions, and thereby whether false 
memories have been formed. In the present study, no significant differences were found 
in the judges' ratings between the experimental conditions. This was not surprising, in 
that the differential processes that are thought to be at play as dictated by the types of 
details presented in a given photograph are geared to influence the participants' feelings 
of remembering, not the volume of their verbal output. The fact that the subjective ratings 
differed across experimental conditions demonstrates that participants' feelings of 
remembering were influenced, although they may not have necessarily been able to 
"prove it" by describing the event in question to the extent that they would have been 
judged as having an image or a memory. Ideally, the participants would have provided a 
descriptive narrative in response to the photograph presented to them that differed in the 
units of memory and/or images identified by the judges according to their experimental 
condition. The fact that this was not the case does not detract from the fact that these 
processes appeared to be at play in terms of the participants' subjective experience. 
These findings can be compared to a recent study by Strange, Hayne, and Garry 
(2008), where the authors presented 10 year-old children with photographs depicting a 
hot-air balloon event. Half of the children saw the hot-air balloon alone, whereas the 
other half saw a doctored photograph with themselves and their family members posing 
in the hot-air balloon. The first photograph can be likened to the non-self-relevant, non-
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constrained condition of the present study, whereas the second photograph can be likened 
to the self-relevant, unconstrained condition. Strange et al. (2008) found that the children 
who had seen the hot-air balloon with themselves and their family posing inside were 
judged as having developed a higher percentage of false memories than children who had 
seen the hot-air balloon by itself. By contrast, the researchers found that children's own 
memory ratings did not differ significantly according to whether or not they saw 
themselves and their family members in the hot-air balloon. 
In terms of the judges' ratings, the raters of transcripts can only use what was said 
by the participants when making their judgments of whether or not memories and/or 
images are present. Perhaps adults are more cautious and hesitant when describing 
events, and tend to filter their statements more than children. This results in adult 
descriptions being more tentative and lacking in rich detail which can be judged as either 
an image or a memory. In terms of the subjective ratings, a possible explanation for the 
lack of significant differences between the groups was that part of the intended self-
relevant detail (i.e. the other family members posing in the balloon with the participant) 
were not held constant. Perhaps at times, it was an uncle, or an aunt, or a distant cousin 
that was present. This would have added an element of constraint to the photograph that 
was not intended, thus reducing the effect of the main self-relevant detail (i.e. the 
participant as a child). An alternative explanation could be related to the stage of 
cognitive development that the 10 year-old children are in. According to Piaget, children 
at this age are in the Concrete Operations stage, in which they are not yet capable of 
thinking abstractly nor logically, nor are they able to draw conclusions from evidence 
presented. Thus, the metacognitive skills that are thought to be at play within adults (i.e. 
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responding to surprising fluency or disfluency of processing) are likely yet to be acquired 
by the children in Strange et al.'s (2008) study. 
Summary and implications 
This study demonstrated, consistent with prior research, that individuals can 
become convinced that they remember an event that never actually occurred to them, 
through the presentation of a doctored photograph, the assertion that their parents 
provided the photograph, and by engaging in guided imagery exercises. Furthermore, the 
types of details presented in the photograph played a significant role in either reducing or 
enhancing the ratings the participants made of their memory for the target event. In some 
instances, the ratings increased from the first interview to the third. These findings have 
implications in both therapeutic and legal arenas. 
In terms of therapy, clinicians must keep in mind that individuals can form 
memories of things that may not have occurred. Looking at a photograph, making a 
suggestion, or engaging in a guided imagery task can all be stepping stones on the road to 
developing a false memory. An individual who is emotionally distressed may strive to 
seek an explanation for their distress. Their overall suggestibility appears related to a 
desire for an explanation, followed by confirmatory bias in the memory search, such as 
when "repressed memory" or "forgetting" is held up as the explanation. Thus, when an 
individual is led, however unintentionally, toward thinking that certain things may have 
happened that could explain their distress, they may more easily accept such suggestions, 
out of a desire to have a concrete explanation for their symptoms. Once an individual 
makes the leap from being confused about their symptomatology to believing the 
suggestion that something (e.g. abuse) may have happened to explain it, any new piece of 
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information may be modified, dismissed, or embellished to the extent that it is consistent 
- or consonant - with the new theory they have come to believe. This is termed 
confirmatory bias (Nickerson, 1998). These types of situations - where an individual 
wants to believe a suggestion because it will help them understand themselves or their 
distressing symptoms - represent conditions where individuals may be more likely to be 
influenced by self-relevant information. This is because they are presumably at the very 
edge between belief and memory, and the feelings of familiarity that are aroused when 
self-relevant details are presented may be especially instrumental in helping the 
individual make the transition from believing to "remembering" - however tenuous that 
memory may be. Once they acknowledge tha they "remember", confirmatory bias 
facilitates the strengthening of this "memory". 
Additionally, there may be certain clinical populations that are more susceptible 
to suggestion. Individuals who have dissociative disorders are characterized as having a 
disruption in memory, identity, and perception. As such they may have difficulties in 
distinguishing actual autobiographical events from fictitious ones. Indeed, higher levels 
of dissociation have been found to be associated with memory errors and false memory 
formation in a variety of studies (e.g. Dorahy, 2001; Wright & Livingston-Raper, 2002; 
Wright & Osborn, 2005). According to the DSM-IV-TR, care must be taken when 
evaluating the accuracy of retrieved memories, especially with these clinical populations. 
It is clear from this body of research that clinicians must be cautious regarding the 
hypotheses that they form when attempting to acertain the underlying causes of their 
patients' difficulties. Hypotheses which are based upon unremembered past events may 
lead to a dialogue that results in inadvertently guiding the patient to confirm this 
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hypothesis. For example, a clinician who felt certain that his client was experiencing 
certain symptoms (e.g. sudden and inexplicable fear of a family member or difficulties in 
sexual relationships) may attempt to facilitate his client's "remembering" by asking 
questions laden with self-relevant content, with the hope of transporting that patient back 
in time and into the environment where the hypothetical abuse took place. The patient 
may mistakenly "remember" being abused by virtue of the suggestion, the feelings of 
familiarity (or cognitive consonance) aroused via the self-relevant, personal details. This 
is where constraining details may play a vitally important role, in that they can be used to 
limit the "domino effect" of fluency of processing that may occur when self-relevant 
details are presented with the goal of arousing maximum feelings of familiarity to 
facilitate remembering. Encouraging an individual to attend to details that may not fit 
with the suggestion of abuse, or that have been ignored or modified by virtue of 
confirmation bias exhibited by the individual when trying to make information consistent 
with a memory of abuse may serve to minimize inaccurate or faulty remembering.. 
However, providing self-relevant details to aide a patient's remembering may be 
beneficial if used with vigilance. For example, other populations who may be vulnerable 
to false memory formation are trauma survivors who have developed Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder. These individuals have actively suppressed the traumatic event that 
occurred to them, and tend to avoid any environmental cues which might remind them of 
this event. However, this avoidance is not completely successful, and results in intrusions 
(e.g. sudden flashbacks of memory fragments or nightmares of the event, which are quite 
frightening to the individual, and lead to further avoidance. What tends to happen, 
though, is that fear cues tend to generalize to include details that become more and more 
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remotely associated with the traumatic event. For example, an individual may have been 
raped in her dorm room at university. Flashbacks may include details of her room, such 
as the color of her sheets, the smell of her perfume, etc. Thus, these stimuli lead to a fear 
response because they remind her of the trauma, and are therefore avoided. The 
individual may start to avoid thinking about her dorm room in general, or even the entire 
residence building. These stimuli now generate a fear response because they remind her 
of the trauma. The generalization of stimuli can transfer broadly, for example leading to 
avoidance of anything that is related to bedrooms or universities. It is obvious that this is 
a maladaptive situation, and the goal of therapy with this individual would ideally focus 
on orienting her to the specific stimuli related to the traumatic event, rather than 
generalized stimuli. The result would be that the unrelated stimuli (e.g. the university, the 
dorm room, the perfume) would cease to evoke the fear response, thus lessening the 
impact of the disorder. These details are constraining in that they are inconsistent with the 
actual memory of the event. Certainly, it occurred at her university, in the residence hall, 
on her floor, but these details were not immediately present during the event, and are thus 
inconsistent with it. Encouraging her to identify this inconsistency may diminish the 
extent of the generalization of fear-inducing stimuli. 
Finally, children represent a population extremely vulnerable to false memory 
formation. It has been demonstrated that children can come to "remember" highly 
implausible and surreal, such as having tea with the prince (Strange, Sutherland & Garry, 
2006), or truly bizarre, ritualistic sexual abuse (e.g. People v. Akiki, 1993; State v. 
Michaels, (1994). As children appear to be much more susceptible to false memory 
formation, further research is warranted in order to clarify exactly how they would 
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respond to the presentation of self-relevant and/or constraining details. This is certainly 
not to say that all recovered memories are untrue. Rather, it is important for therapists to 
be aware of the ways in which memory can be manipulated, and the conditions under 
which false memories can flourish optimally. 
In the legal arena, the same principles apply. Individuals may be shown 
photographs of a crime scene, or may be questioned in a way that can help "facilitate 
their remembering". Although leading questions are generally not permitted in the 
courtroom, attorneys will frequently attempt to ask them in a disguised manner. Leading 
questions, however, are not the only ones that are problematic. From the results of the 
present study, questions laden with self-relevant content (when the desire is for the 
witness to remember a given event) or with constraining content (when the desire is for 
the witness not to remember a given event) can be equally damaging. For example, if 
officers questioning eyewitnesses to a crime have a prejudice about aspects of the 
circumstances of the crime, they may inadvertently suggest a story line to the eyewitness 
and "helpfully" provide a lot of consistent details (i.e. ones that the eyewitness surely 
saw) but might add a detail or two based on their preconceived hypothesis as to what may 
have happened. Increased knowledge on the part of lawmakers about how memory can be 
manipulated by the content of memory cues can hopefully contribute to improved 
standards of interrogating witnesses. 
Overall, the present study found that, in terms of participants' subjective 
evaluations of their own memory, the types of details contained in photographs 
differentially influence memory ratings. Pairing self-relevant details with non-
constraining details creates the most optimal condition for high subjective memory 
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ratings. However, presenting self-relevant and constraining details visually, as opposed to 
verbally, results in an interesting interaction between the two types of details. It appears 
as though the strength of self-relevant details is influence by the presence (or lack 
thereof) of constraining details. When presented without constraining details, self-
relevant details appear to work as hypothesized in that they promote feelings of 
familiarity and cognitive consonance, which results in significantly higher memory 
ratings than any of the other groups. When constraining details are added, however, it 
appears as though fluency is impeded by the constraining detail, and the strength of the 
self-relevant detail is too weak to overcome the disfluency, or dissonance, that results, 
leading on significantly lower memory ratings. 
Limitations and future research directions 
A possible limitation of this study, that may have contributed to the overall low 
false memory formation rate, is that individuals are becoming increasingly aware of 
digital imaging technology, and are thus more skeptical of the authenticity of 
photographic stimuli if they do not remember the event depicted therein. This may 
partially explain why so many participants guessed correctly which photograph was false 
at the end of the third interview, once told that one of them was doctored. Another 
limitation is that the cell sizes were unequal due to participants dropping out, thus 
compromising statistical power. Therefore, where some findings were marginally 
significant (e.g. the marginal effect of constraint on the ABMQ memory ratings), adding 
additional participants might have resulted in statistical significance. Also, all but two of 
the participants guessed the false photograph at the end of the third interview. Perhaps 
altering the angle from which the hot-air balloon was photographed would make it more 
believable. Another improvement could be printing the photographs on photo-quality 
paper, which would increase their apparent authenticity. Finally, there was no way to 
guarantee that participants did not discuss the photographs with friends and/or family, 
which may have contributed to the low overall false memory formations rate. 
In terms of future directions, research needs to be done to further investigate the 
relationship between self-relevance and constraint. This is important in order to be able 
to learn how to use these two details types in such a manner as to enhance memory 
recovery, but at the same time maximize accuracy of the memory, specifically to examine 
how false memory formation rate is affected by increasing the level of constraint. This 
can be done in one of two ways: a) by presenting increasing levels of constraining details 
in false photographs, and b) by coupling self-relevant details with other self-relevant, 
though contextually inconsistent, details. An example would be to include a picture of an 
individual's first grade teacher (a highly self-relevant detail) in the context of the 
individual's back yard (incorrect context). 
Ultimately, effective memory search systems should strike an optimal balance 
between being able to identify familiar information, but not to the extent that memory 
searches become so extensive that they're no longer relevant to the context of the search. 
The items that are self relevant are (and must continue to be) flexible. Each day, new 
information becomes relevant to the individual, while other information loses relevance, 
thus the concept of self-relevance is constantly changing. Yet to be effective, the 
inclusion of new details as self-relevant must be selective to a point, to prevent the 
overgeneralization of familiarity. If memory search systems are too broad, the likelihood 
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that false memories occur can be enhanced, and when memory searches are too 
constrained, access to true memories may be impeded. 
Additional directions could include examining how false memory formation rates 
are affected by increasing amounts of self-relevant details. Perhaps, there will come a 
point where self-relevant details will impede the formation of false memories because of 
the relative implausibility of so many familiar objects being grouped together. This could 
be thought of as fluency saturation: the point at which self-relevant details cease to 
enhance fluency of processing and subsequent memory formation, but rather impede it. 
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Appendix A - Sample Doctored Photograph 
Sample family photograph and an example of how it was modified according to the four 
experimental conditions. 
Non-Self-Relevant Self-Relevant 
Appendix B - General Consent Form 
74 
U N I V E R S I T Y O F 
WINDSOR 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
Title of Study: Memory Recovery Techniques: How effective are they? 
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Joanna Hessen 
(M.A. Student) from the Department of Psychology at the University of 
Windsor. The result of the study will constribute to the completion of a M.A. 
Thesis. This research is sponsored in part by SSHRC CGS - Master's 
Award No. 766-2007-0439. 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel to contact 
Joanna Hessen (Principal Investigator) at hessen(5)uwindsor.ca, or Dr. Alan 
Scoboria (Faculty Supervisor) at (519)253-3000, ext. 4090. 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This study is designed to assess the effectiveness of various techniques 
used in trying to assist in the recovery of childhood memories. 
PROCEDURES 
If you volunteer to participate in this study, we would ask you to do the following 
things: 
• You were asked to provide consent for the Primary Investigator to 
contact your parents to obtain photographs of you when you were a 
child. 
• You will then be asked to attend three (3) separate sessions over the 
course of one (1) week. During these sessions, you were asked to 
remember a variety of childhood events, while looking at the 
photographs provided by your parents as memory cues. 
• You were asked to provide all of the information you can think of 
regarding each event, without leaving anything out. In the event that 
you cannot remember a particular event you were asked to close 
your eyes and try to imagine what it may have been like to 
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experience the event, how you may have felt that day, what you may 
have been thinking, who was with you during the event. 
• All of your answers were audio-taped in order to be able to assess 
the quality of your memories for each event. You were asked to 
answer some questions regarding the quality of your memory for 
each of the events. 
• You were provided with a booklet containing the photographs 
corresponding to the events you are being asked to remember. You 
were asked to look at this booklet between interviews to help you in 
remembering the events. 
• Each interview will last approximately 30 minutes, with a total 
participation time requirement of 2 hours (including the preliminary 
session of signing the consent form and setting up the interview 
times). The three interviews will take place over the period of one 
week. You were reminded of your interview time by telephone call the 
evening prior to each interview. 
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
This study does not carry with it any foreseeable risks, discomforts, or 
inconveniences. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
There are no individual benefits from the participation in this study. 
Potential benefits to science and society expected from this research are 
such that the effectiveness of certain common memory recovery 
techniques were assessed. This plays a role in determining the most 
effective use of these techniques in therapy sessions, where the 
remembering of a given childhood memory is an important part of the 
therapeutic process. 
PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION 
There were no individual financial compensation for participation in this 
study. Upon completion of the three interviews, you were rewarded with 
three (3) experimental credits. At the end of all interview sessions, if you 
have attended all of them, you were entered into a draw for one of six (6) 
prizes of $50.00. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be 
identified with you will remain confidential and were disclosed only with your 
permission. 
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Your name will only be retained by the primary researcher, for the purposes 
of contacting your parents for your childhood photographs, to remind you 
of your interview session times, for assigning credits, and for contacting 
you regarding the results of the draw. You were given an identification 
code by the primary researcher, which is the only information the research 
assistants who interview you will have about you. After the study is over 
and the results of the draw are disseminated, all of your personal 
identification information were destroyed. The photographs were returned 
to you at the end of the third interview session in the same condition in 
which they were provided. 
The interview sessions were taped and transcribed for the purpose of 
evaluating the quality of your memory for each event. Once transcribed and 
once the transcripts are rated regarding memory quality, both the tapes 
and transcripts were destroyed. Only the primary researcher will have 
access to the tapes and transcripts prior to their destruction. 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
You can choose whether to be in this study or not. If you volunteer to be in this 
study, you may withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind. You 
may also refuse to answer any questions you don't want to answer and still 
remain in the study. The investigator may withdraw you from this research if 
circumstances arise which warrant doing so. You have the right to request that 
your data not be used in the study. 
FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE SUBJECTS 
Research findings were made available to all interested parties upon 
completion, on the Research Ethics Board web site 
(www.uwindsor.ca/REB). Please provide your e-mail if you would like to 
receive a notification when the results become available for you to view. 
Web address: TBA 
Date when results are available: JDctober 31, 2008. 
SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA 
At times, it may be necessary to analyze data in conjunction with data from other 
studies. I agree that this data can be used in subsequent studies. 
Do you give consent for the subsequent use of the data from this study? 
• Yes • No 
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RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without 
penalty. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, 
contact: Research Ethics Coordinator, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario 
N9B 3P4; telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3916; e-mail: lbunn@uwindsor.ca. 
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH SUBJECT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 
I understand the information provided for the study Memory Recovery 
Techniques: How effective are they? as described herein. My questions have 
been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. I have 
been given a copy of this form. 
Name of Subject 
Signature of Subject Date 
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR 
These are the terms under which I will conduct research. 
Signature of Investigator Date 
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Appendix D - Consent to Contact Parents 
ft 
U N I V E R S I T Y O F 
WINDSOR 
Consent to Contact Parents 
Memory Recovery Techniques: How effective are they? 
I, , provide permission for my parent(s)/guardian(s) to be 
contacted for the purposes of collecting information for a study of childhood events. I 
understand that this information were used solely for the purposes of the study, and will 
otherwise remain confidential. I further understand that I were contacted to participate in 
the remainder of this study, which will require approximately one and one half hours of 
my time, and were worth 3 experimental credits. 
Please address the attached envelope to your parent(s)/guardian(s), but do not detach it 
from this form. Should you have parents or guardians living in different locations, please 
select the one whom you spent the majority of time with prior to the age of 6. 
Signature 
Student Number 
Student's Phone Number 
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Appendix E - Letter of Information for Parents 
ft 
U N I V E R S I T Y O F 
WINDSOR 
Joanna Hessen 
Department of Psychology 
University of Windsor 
Windsor, Ontario, Canada 
September 1,2007 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
Your child, , is participating in a study of childhood 
memory at the University of Windsor. She or he has provided permission (see attached 
letter) for you to provide events that occurred to her/him. We would appreciate if you 
would take a few minutes of your time and provide a number of photographs along with 
descriptions of a number of events which occurred to your child prior to the age of 6. 
Please review the categories provided below. If you know of any event(s) which your 
son/daughter experienced prior to the age of six in any category, please provide 
information about the activities which took place, the location, the people involved, and 
your child's age at the time. I would appreciate if you would provide as many 
photographs and corresponding descriptions as possible, whether or not they fit the 
categories provided. It is preferred that you seek specifically the photographs that your 
child has not seen. 
For example, an event might be written: At the age of 4, at a friend of the family's 
wedding, spilled the punch bowl onto the father of the bride. 
We request that you do not discuss this letter, nor the information you have provided with 
your child until such a time as the study has been completed. Upon the completion of 
their participation in the study, your child will receive a full explanation of the purpose of 
the study, all of the pictures you have provided in their original condition, as well as a 
copy of the list of events you have provided. 
Please return the form to us using the pre-addressed envelope enclosed with this letter. 
Or, if you have digitalized photographs, you may email your response to address@server. 
82 
Appenix F - ABMQ 
CHILDHOOD EVENT INVENTORY 
Below are some events that may or may not happen to people before the age of 6. Please 
answer four questions about each event. 
The first question has to do with how plausible it is that events like this happen to people in 
general. The second question asks how plausible it is that events like this could have happened 
to you. There are many events that may happen to some people in general but are not plausible 
for you (e.g. it is very plausible that many people got stung by a hornet when they were younger, 
regardless of whether they remember it; however, you may have grown up in an area of the world 
with no hornets and so it is unlikely that this could have happened to you, whether or not it did). 
Also, many things happen that people do not remember having happened. People can know 
something happened to them, without remembering the event (for example, you probably know 
where you were born, even though you don't remember being born). Therefore, the third question 
asks your belief as to whether you think the event happened to you while the fourth question asks 
whether you actually remember this event. 
Lastly, please keep in mind that all the following events ask questions about events that happen 
at or before the age of 6. 
Event 1. 
Choking on a small object, at or before the age of 6. 
A. How plausible is it that at least some people, before the age of 6, choke on a small 
object? 
Not at all Plausible 1 2 3 ' 4 * 5 s 6 7 * 8 Extremely Plausible 
B. How plausible is it that you personally, before the age of 6, could have choked on a 
small object? 
Not at all Plausible l 1 2 3 ' 4 ' 5 6 7 8 Extremely Plausible 
C. How likely is it that you personally, before the age of 6, did in fact choke on a small 
object? 
Definitely did not happen 1 2 3 ' 4 * 5 6 7 8 Definitely happened 
D. Do you actually remember choking on a small object before you were the age of 6? 
No memory of event at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 ' 1 " 8 Clear and 
complete 
memory of event 
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Event 2. 
True Event experienced uniquely by a specific participant 
A. How plausible is it that at least some people, before the age of 6, [INSERT EVENT]? 
Not at all Plausible 1 ' 2 ' 3 4 5 6 ' 7 ' 8 Extremely Plausible 
B. How plausible is it that you personally, before the age of 6, [INSERT EVENT]? 
Not at all Plausible 1 l ' 3 4* 5 ' 6 ' 7 ' 8 Extremely Plausible 
C. How likely is it that you personally, before the age of 6, [INSERT EVENT]? 
(" C" f" ("" ('" f" ("" ("" 
Definitely did not happen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Definitely happened 
D. Do you actually remember [INSERT EVENT] before you were the age of 6? 
No memory of event at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Clear and 
complete 
memory of event 
Event 3. 
Going on a hot-air balloon ride, at or before the age of 6. 
A. How plausible is it that at least some people, before the age of 6, go on a hot-air balloon 
ride? 
Not at all Plausible " 1 ' 2 3 " 4 5 * 6 ' 7 ' 8 Extremely Plausible 
B. How plausible is it that you personally, before the age of 6, could have gone on a hot-air 
balloon ride? 
Not at all Plausible ' 1 " 2 3 4 5 ' 6 * 7 * 8 Extremely Plausible 
C. How likely is it that you personally, before the age of 6, did in fact go on a hot-air 
balloon ride? 
Definitely did not happen 1 2 3 ' 4 5 6 ' 7 8 Definitely happened 
D. Do you actually remember going on a hot-air balloon ride before you were the age of 6? 
No memory of event at all 1 2 3 4 5 ' 6 7 8 Clear and 
complete 
memory of event 
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Event 4. 
Receiving a bone density screening, at or before the age of 6. 
A. How plausible is it that at least some people, before the age of 6, receive a bone density 
screening? 
Not at all Plausible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Plausible 
B. How plausible is it that you personally, before the age of 6, could have received a bone 
density screening? 
C r r- r r C f r 
Not at all Plausible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Plausible 
C. How likely is it that you personally, before the age of 6, did in fact receive a bone 
density screening? 
r r r r r r r r 
Definitely did not happen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Definitely happened 
D. Do you actually remember receiving a bone density screening before you were the age 
of 6? 
No memory of event at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Clear and 
complete 
memory of event 
Event 5. 
Seeing a UFO at or before the age of 6. 
A. How plausible is it that at least some people, before the age of 6, see a UFO? 
Not at all Plausible 1 2 ' 3 ' 4 5 ' 6 7 ' 8 Extremely Plausible 
B. How plausible is it that you personally, before the age of 6, could have seen a UFO? 
r r c -r r r r r 
Not at all Plausible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Extremely Plausible 
C. How likely is it that you personally, before the age of 6, did in fact see a UFO? 
r- r r r r r r- r 
Definitely did not happen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Definitely happened 
D. Do you actually remember seeing a UFO before you were the age of 6? 
No memory of event at all " 1 2 3 4 5 * 6 ' 7 8 Clear and 
complete 
memory of event 
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Appendix G - Memory Characteristics Questions 
On a 7-point scale (1 = low, 7 = high), please rate to what extent the following 
statements apply to you. 
1) You were able to relive the event in your mind 
2) You were able to see the event in your mind 
3) You were able to hear the event in your mind 
4) You were able to feel emotions associated with the event 
5) You remember the event rather than just know that it happened 
6) You remember the event as a coherent story 
7) You believe the event occurred in the way remembered 
8) You had talked/thought about the event in the past 
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Appendix I - Logistic Regression Analyses of Judges' Ratings 
Logistic regression analysis of the frequency of judges' ratings at Time 1 



































Logistic regression analysis of the frequency of judges' rating at Time 2 
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